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Abstract
Purpose – The paper examines disputed interpretations of ‘key meanings’ between the audit
regulator and Big 4 firms during a highly contentious regulatory debate, showcasing their use
of ‘strategies of resistance’ to achieve their intended outcomes.
Design/methodology/approach – A qualitative analysis is performed of the discourse in a
South African audit regulatory debate, set within the country’s unique political and historical
context. The analysis is informed by the theoretical construct of a ‘regulatory space’ and an
established typology of strategic responses to institutional pressures.
Findings – Our findings show how resistance to regulatory intentions from influential actors,
notably the Big 4 firms, was dispelled. This was achieved by the regulator securing oversight
independence, co-opting political support, shortening the debate timeline and unilaterally
revising the interpretation of its statutory mandate. The regulator successfully incorporated race
equality into its interpretation of how the public interest is advanced (in addition to audit
quality). The social legitimacy of the Big 4 was then further undermined. The debate was highly
contentious and unproductive and likely contributed to overall societal concerns regarding the
legitimacy of, and the value ascribed to, the audit function.
Practical implications – A deeper appreciation of vested interests and differing interpretations
of key concepts and regulatory logic could help to promote a less combative regulatory
environment, in the interest of enhanced audit quality and the sustainability and legitimacy of
the audit profession.
Originality/value – The context provides an example, contrary to that observed in many
jurisdictions, where the Big 4 fail to actively resist or even dilute significant regulatory reform.
Furthermore, the findings indicate that traditional conceptions of what it means to serve ‘the
public interest’ may be evolving in favour of a more liberal social democratic interpretation.
Keywords: Public interest, Audit regulation, Audit quality, Auditor rotation
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1. Introduction
The audit profession is built on the foundational ethic of ‘serving the public interest’ (IESBA,
2018, p. 16), with this phrase regularly employed to justify both current practice and regulatory
change (Dellaportas & Davenport, 2008; Lee, 1995; van Brenk, Renes, & Trompeter, 2020).
Researchers likewise use the concept to examine the consequences of, and motivations behind,
accounting and audit practice (see, Baker, 2005; Baudot, Roberts, & Wallace, 2017; Lee, 1995;
Paisey & Paisey, 2020). The traditional interpretation of the concept, as it applies to auditors,
revolves around their obligation to deliver high quality audits and avert costly corporate failures
(Hopwood, 1989; IESBA, 2018; Mautz & Sharaf, 1961). Yet, as such failures persist, and
regulatory audit inspections (practice reviews) increasingly identify deficient audit practice,
auditors’ rhetoric of serving the public interest rings hollow and is increasingly questioned
(Sikka, 2009; van Brenk et al., 2020; Westermann, Cohen, & Trompeter, 2019). Audit failures
also reflect poorly on regulators, causing them to threaten more onerous intervention. It appears
that regulatory debate is becoming increasingly contentious and unproductive (Dowling,
Knechel, & Moroney, 2018; Horton, Tsipouridou, & Wood, 2018; Malsch & Gendron, 2011)
with traditional conceptions of the public interest perhaps becoming “inadequate to define a
principle which must stand as a measure of public policy” (Dellaportas & Davenport, 2008, p.
1080).
Prior research indicates that the profession, dominated by the Big 4 firms, often successfully
resist regulators in certain local contexts, resulting in regulatory compromises and diluted
rulings (see, Horton et al., 2018; Malsch & Gendron, 2011; Reid & Carcello, 2017; Shapiro &
Matson, 2008). The agenda of the Big 4 to protect their interests incentivise behaviours which
allow considerable influence in turning regulatory reform outcomes in their favour (Canning &
O’Dwyer, 2013; Malsch & Gendron, 2011; Sikka, 2009). Audit regulators have tended to adopt
more ‘passive’ compromise or acquiescence ‘strategies of resistance’ (Oliver, 1991) as they
find themselves confronted with more ‘aggressive’ opposition by the profession. Furthermore,
regulatory debates provide evidence of disputed understandings of key regulatory premises and
regulatory logic, which inhibit productive outcomes (e.g., Canning & O’Dwyer, 2013;
Caramanis et al., 2015; Hazgui & Gendron, 2015; MacDonald & Richardson, 2004; Malsch &
Gendron, 2011; Young, 1994). Consensus around such meanings, as well as actor success in
applying resistance strategies, whether active or passive, influences final regulatory outcomes
(Hancher & Moran, 1989; Oliver, 1991).
Due to growing concerns of deteriorating audit quality and the success of the profession to slow
and dilute regulatory interventions, the resolve and resistance from audit regulators is growing,
together with political backing for stricter reform (see, Dowling et al., 2018; The Economist,
2019b, 2019a). Differences in local jurisdictions and ‘regulatory spaces’, with the “contextually
contingent factors that local regulators must confront” (Canning & O’Dwyer, 2013, p. 170),
present rich contexts for the development of better understandings of different interpretations
of public interest and strategies of resistance (Hazgui & Malsch, 2020; Spence, Zhu, Endo, &
Matsubara, 2017). Accordingly, we contribute to understandings of the meaning and use of the
term ‘the public interest’ in audit regulatory debate, as well as explore differing interpretations
of what an audit regulator’s mandate should entail (see, Baker, 2005; Baudot et al., 2017;
Dellaportas & Davenport, 2008; Hopwood, 1989; Paisey & Paisey, 2020). The distinct
historical context of our South African case study uniquely reveals new conceptions of public
interest, which has implications for audit regulation elsewhere in the world. The objective of
such research is not merely to document the debate or the self-interested behaviour of the actors,
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“but also to examine the specific strategies, rationales, and resources the agents mobilize to
achieve their goals” (Shapiro & Matson, 2008, p. 202). We seek to examine, within a theoretical
framework, the strategies used by actors to influence regulatory discourse and its outcome (as
for example, in Canning & O’Dwyer, 2013; Caramanis, Dedoulis, & Leventis, 2015; Hazgui
& Malsch, 2020; Malsch & Gendron, 2011; Young, 1994). This specific contextual
understanding illustrates enhanced social empowerment to exercise extra-professional
‘democratic’ control over auditors, attempting to align auditor behaviour with the public
interest, and improve audit quality (Cooper & Robson, 2006; van Brenk et al., 2020).
The South African case study provides a recent, highly disputed and globally relevant policy
debate over mandatory audit firm rotation (MAFR), a highly topical and globally contested
audit regulation. MAFR has been contested in multiple jurisdictions in recent years, perhaps
most notably in the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) (Horton et al., 2018; Reid
& Carcello, 2017). Internationally, as in South Africa, the Big 4 firms argue it to be
unnecessary, disruptive and costly in comparison to the more established ‘partner-only rotation’
rules1 (Harber & Maroun, 2020; Horton et al., 2018). Yet, unlike what unfolded in the EU and
the US, and counter to the trend in the literature, the South African profession, dominated by
the Big 4 firms, was wholly unable to resist the intentions of the regulator. Opposition to MAFR
in the EU significantly “watered down” the original proposals (Horton et al., 2018, p. 991) and
in the US fully repelled it (Reid & Carcello, 2017). This provides the opportunity to examine
how the audit regulator was successful in their resistance. We examine the historical professionstate nexus of the audit regulator to contextualise the unfolding MAFR debate that began with
a consultation phase in 2015 and ended contentiously and abruptly in June 2017 with a ruling
to adopt the policy. To inform our interpretation of the discourse we mobilize the theoretical
construct of a ‘regulatory space’ (Hancher & Moran, 1989; Scott, 2001) where ‘actors’ respond
strategically in that space to institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991) to affect regulatory outcomes.
Despite increasing research into accounting regulatory processes, more focus is needed on “the
processes through which new regulatory arrangements are formulated in different national
contexts” (Canning & O’Dwyer, 2013, p. 171; Cooper & Robson, 2006; MacDonald &
Richardson, 2004; Malsch & Gendron, 2011). Understanding the local context of the regulatory
space helps interpret the “regulatory styles, and their impact on national economic and social
‘performance’” (Cooper & Robson, 2006, p. 436). The historical and political context of a
society has a direct bearing on the strategies of actors within regulatory debate (Oliver, 1991).
As highlighted by Spence et al. (2017), research is biased in favour of Western European and
North American empirical contexts, and the ‘rules of the game’ of regulatory debate may differ
in non-Western countries. In any specific local context actors are constrained or encouraged by
“the approbation of external constituents or society” to enhance their legitimacy or sustain their
logic (Oliver, 1991, p. 153).
Our findings evidence unique adoptions of resistance strategies and disputed meanings, which
were highly influential in determining the regulatory outcome. The South African regulator,
whether expediently or with a genuine intent to protect the public interest (or both), redefined
public interest to incorporate race equality outcomes, in accordance with the political ideology
of the state. Enabled by a historically more ‘independent’ positioning relative to the profession,
the regulator co-opted state support, embraced the disputed meanings and successfully
1
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compromised the social legitimacy of the Big 4 to achieve an undiluted policy reform proposal,
such as was not able to be achieved in the EU or the US on this most topical of audit reforms
(i.e., MAFR). Our findings support those of Canning and O’Dwyer (2013, p. 171) which
highlight the importance of “regulator vigilance” to vested interests and the need to secure
“wider legal and political backing for regulatory agendas”. Using these ‘resistance tactics’
(Oliver, 1991) the South African regulator was able to fully resist both the profession and its
aligned capital market interest groups. The strategic paradigm shift by the regulator
surrounding what it means for auditors ‘to act in the public interest’ not only reflects the
historical context of South Africa’s history of racial segregation but may constitute a theoretical
widening of the concept consistent with changing understandings of the role of accountants.
There is a growing appreciation for the obligation of accountants and auditors to prioritise wider
social interests, rather than narrowly focusing on capital interests (Baker, 2005; Gallhofer &
Haslam, 2019; Hopwood, 1989; Lehman, 2019). Our findings have international application,
as social justice concerns, such as race (Annisette & Prasad, 2017) and gender (Haynes, 2017;
Lehman, 2019) equality, are becoming an increasing concern within accounting contexts
(Gallhofer & Haslam, 2019).
The paper is structured as follows: the next section discusses the theoretical framework
adopted, emphasising the resistance strategies available to actors (Oliver, 1991) operating
within a regulatory space construct (Hancher & Moran, 1989). Here we review the literature
examining how accounting regulation has been resisted in other jurisdictions. The next section
provides a brief description of the regulatory logic of MAFR, together with a political and
historical discussion of the South African context, which informs the analysis. We then describe
the qualitative method applied, including a description of the data, which is then followed by
our analysis and interpretation of the regulatory process and discourse. The paper concludes by
linking the analysis to the theoretical framing, providing summative observations as well as
implications for future practice and research.
2. Theoretical framework
2.1 Vested interests within the ‘regulatory space’
As the central guiding ethic of the audit profession, indeed its ‘distinguishing mark’ (IESBA,
2018, p. 16), serving ‘the public interest’ is traditionally interpreted as the delivery of ‘audit
quality’ while acting with integrity uncompromised by economic interests (IESBA, 2018; Lee,
1995; Mautz & Sharaf, 1961). Understandably then, appeals to the ideal are pervasive
throughout audit regulatory debate (Dellaportas & Davenport, 2008; Lee, 1995; Paisey &
Paisey, 2020), and those unable to demonstrate this ideal convincingly within a ‘regulatory
space’ cease to maintain the legitimacy required to impact the debate (Hancher & Moran, 1989;
Scott, 2001; Young, 1994).
This notion of ‘regulatory space’ (Hancher & Moran, 1989; Scott, 2001) has frequently been
employed in research examining regulatory debate to understand how regulation is developed,
debated and interpreted (see, Canning & O’Dwyer, 2013; Hazgui & Gendron, 2015;
MacDonald & Richardson, 2004; Malsch & Gendron, 2011). Developed by Hancher and
Moran (1989), a ‘regulatory space’ refers to “an abstract conceptual space constructed by
people, organisations, and events acting together upon a set of specific regulatory issues subject
to public decisions” (Canning & O’Dwyer, 2013, p. 172). As an “analytical construct” (Young,
1994, p. 84) constituting “a range of regulatory issues subject to public decision” (Hancher &
Moran, 1989, p. 277) this space is shared by ‘actors’ who have obtained, and need to sustain,
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their legitimacy to negotiate within the space. The concept allows researchers to “reconceive
regulatory processes” (Scott, 2001, p. 2) and investigate the strategies of bargaining between
interdependent and powerful actors who are admitted into the space, each with their own vested
interests and potentially different interpretations, yielding a better understanding of why a
certain regulatory outcome was reached (Hancher & Moran, 1989; Scott, 2001; Young, 1994).
The political ambitions, vested interests, historical contexts and different interpretations of
regulatory principles by actors are considered as influential to regulatory outcomes (Hancher
& Moran, 1989; Scott, 2001). Furthermore, actors’ interpretation of, and co-operation with, the
regulator’s mandate, including how the regulator itself “handled the ambiguity of its mandate
and powers given under the law”, is an important aspect influencing outcomes and behaviour
(MacDonald & Richardson, 2004, p. 520).
Auditors clearly have economic self-interest, yet it should be recognised that regulators, as
quasi-state bodies, do as well. Ideally, government regulation within a liberal democracy is a
tool to selflessly realign private interests and behaviours with ‘the common good’ (Cochran,
1974). However, conflicting social, economic and political incentives by actors, including
government actors, may thwart this objective, infiltrating the regulatory space and impacting
legislative outcomes. As Peltzman (1976, p. 215) argues; “what is basically at stake in
regulatory processes, is a transfer of wealth”. As the concept of ‘the public interest’ is
appropriated and employed in political dialogue, it has been identified as an indication for “the
way the wind is blowing” in politics (Cochran, 1974, p. 328).
“Regulation is indisputably a political process and it thus exhibits one of the
defining features of any such process - it involves the contest for power”
(Hancher & Moran, 1989. p. 4)
Audit practice and regulation is not without its “contestable relations… highly situated in the
context of human interests” (Arrington & Puxty, 1991, p. 31). Research into the dynamics of
audit regulatory debates must therefore actively consider vested interests and how actor
behaviour is “implicated in the construction and propagation of notions of organizational and
social control” (Hopwood, 1989, p. 141). Politically powerful actors (perhaps regulator or
auditor) will inevitably act to prevent changes which “undermine their power, autonomy, or
survival” and thus researchers need to examine the “specific strategies, rationales, and
resources” these actors use to do so (Shapiro & Matson, 2008, p. 202).
2.2 Strategic responses to institutional pressures
Prior accounting research indicates that influential actors, most notably the Big 4, are able to
influence regulators strategically to compromise regulation in their favour. Shapiro and Matson
(2008, p. 199) show how “powerful organizations and individuals employed active strategies
of avoidance, defiance, and manipulation” (refer to the typology in Table 1) to defeat regulation
designed to require companies to assess and publicly report internal financial controls. Malsch
and Gendron (2011, p. 464) show how the Canadian Public Accountability Board (CPAB) was
subtly captured by the profession from its inception to reduce it to a benign “monitoring
device”, “whose main functionality is to reassure capital markets about the quality of financial
audit work”. This was shown to have been subtly achieved by the profession over time through
strategic rhetorical influence and agenda setting, resulting in “a private circuit of power” aimed
at preserving a measure of self-regulation under the guise of an ‘independent regulator’ (Malsch
& Gendron, 2011, p. 473). Malsch and Gendron (2011), as well as Hazgui and Malsch (2020)
4

in a Canadian and French context respectively, show how the Big 4 firms use their international
resources and political clout to impact local regulatory spaces.
These strategic actions by influential actors may help or hinder the regulator, leaving it either
“toothless or dominant” (Hazgui & Gendron, 2015, p. 784). To examine the various strategies
employed within such regulatory disputes we will use Oliver's (1991, p. 152) typology of
strategies of resistance to institutional processes, which theorises “how elite and powerful
institutions will attempt to actively shape and defeat legislation and regulation that adversely
affects their interests” (Shapiro & Matson, 2008, p. 201). The typology, summarised here in
Table 1, conceptualises strategies and tactics as ranging from passive to active, as predicted by
specific circumstances.
Table 1: Summary of Oliver's (1991) strategic responses to institutional pressures

Source: Adapted from Oliver (1991, p. 152)
Research testing this theory, mostly conducted in non-accounting contexts, has confirmed
Oliver’s predictions namely, that the more active (or aggressive) resistance strategies are more
likely “where proposed institutional changes reduced targeted actor discretion, were
inconsistent with the goals of the targeted actors, and where targeted actors were less dependent
on pressurising constituents for resources” (Canning & O’Dwyer, 2013, p. 174). Oliver (1991,
p. 159-172) explain how actors are incentivised to oppose a regulator more vociferously the
less concerned they are with their social legitimacy, the greater the stakeholder support they
can muster and the less dependent they are on the regulator for resources (amongst other
factors).
The more active resistance strategies include avoidance, defiance and manipulation (Table 1)
of the regulatory processes, some of which were exhibited in the settings where actors
successfully, or at least partially, resisted the regulators intentions (e.g., Malsch & Gendron,
2011; Shapiro & Matson, 2008). The success of the Big 4 firms in Canada for example, to align
themselves strategically with the regulator, as described by Malsch and Gendron (2011),
allowed them to create a form of self-regulation under the guise of independent regulatory
oversight. Malsch and Gendron (2011) provide examples of what Oliver (1991, p. 152)
describes as “contesting rules and requirements”, “shaping values and criteria” and
5

“dominating institutional constituents and processes” in a regulatory space. In the face of such
active resistance, the regulator conceded to the pressures with compromise and acquiescence.
The result was diluted regulatory outcomes and regulatory authority. Canning and O’Dwyer
(2013) showed how both the regulator and the actors in opposition may employ active
resistance strategies against each other, and even varying strategies at different points in time.
In this Irish context it was the multipronged defiance strategy of the regulator that won the day
as it obtained legal support for its interpretation of its regulatory mandate and garnered “the
sheer weight of local political backing for its establishment and its mandate” (Canning &
O’Dwyer, 2013, p. 191).
Although it appears that the Big 4 firms, with aligned capital market interests, have been highly
successful in influencing accounting regulation in their favour (see, Malsch & Gendron, 2011;
Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005)2, there are some examples of regulatory successes, as shown in
the Irish context of Canning and O’Dwyer (2013). Another example is the Canadian Public
Accountants Council of Ontario’s strategy to implement the Public Accountancy Act of 1950,
which opposed resistance “by limiting access to licences and amalgamating to suppress
dissension, the Council effectively limited the number of challengers in their regulatory space”
(MacDonald & Richardson, 2004, p. 520). Such successes appear to be uncommon, as
regulators face different local contextual dynamics, compromising their ability to fully resist
influential external pressures that align with “capital markets and their laissez-faire logic”
(Malsch & Gendron, 2011, p. 463).
3. MAFR and the South African case narrative
In this section we provide a brief description of the regulatory logic of MAFR, followed by a
discussion of the South African socio-political context which surrounds the empirical setting.
3.1 The regulatory logic
In principle, MAFR is designed to improve audit quality by limiting the tenure of the
consecutive appointment of an individual audit firm and thus preserving auditor independence
(Casterella & Johnston, 2013; Garcia-Blandon, Argilés-Bosch, & Ravenda, 2020; Tepalagul &
Lin, 2015). Indeed, most audit regulation focuses on either strengthening the competency
(expertise) or the independence (integrity) of the auditor (Knechel, Krishnan, Pevzner,
Shefchik, & Velury, 2013; Tepalagul & Lin, 2015). MAFR is a stricter form of auditor rotation
in comparison with the more traditional partner-only rotation rules recommended by
international accounting guidelines (IESBA, 2018). To date few countries have adopted or
retained MAFR (Casterella & Johnston, 2013; Harber & Maroun, 2020), but the recent adoption
in the EU and then South Africa is perhaps evidence that this could be changing.
Understandably, with the likelihood of major disruption to audit firms’ client bases and revenue
streams, MAFR is deeply unpopular with audit firms, especially the Big 4 (Harber & Maroun,
2020; Horton et al., 2018; The Economist, 2019a).
In Figure 1 we illustrate the regulatory logic of auditor rotation. Each attribute (independence
and expertise), {1} and {2}, is positively associated with the quality of the audit outcome {4}

2

The Big 4 success in both the US and EU to prevent or dilute MAFR rules are further examples (refer Section 3.2), as is the
success of the Big 4 in expanding their business models into ‘multidisciplinary’ professional service firms in the early 2000s
(Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005).
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(Knechel et al., 2013; Tepalagul & Lin, 2015) and in turn, presumably, the ability of the auditor
to act in the public interest.
Figure 1: The logic of auditor rotation

Lengthy auditor tenures, whether audit firm or partner tenure {3}, spanning many years, if not
decades in the case of audit firm tenure, has long been argued to impair auditor independence
(- association) and thereby compromise audit quality (Mautz & Sharaf, 1961). This is the
primary argument put forward by regulators to justify adoption of MAFR or stricter (shorter
tenure) partner rotation rules (Garcia-Blandon et al., 2020). As evidence of independence
compromise, regulators appeal to audit failures and adverse findings in practice reviews
(Dowling et al., 2018; Westermann et al., 2019). Opponents to MAFR however, appeal to the
‘switching costs’ associated with rotation, most notably the negative impact on audit quality of
removing the more experienced auditor, the auditor who is familiar with the financial
complexity of the client’s operations. The argument is that an auditor’s knowledge and
experience of the client increases over the years the audit firm remains appointed, improving
their ability to detect and then report on error and fraud (+ association) (Casterella & Johnston,
2013). The extant research has not settled the disagreement, presenting a considerable degree
of mixed findings, both concerning the efficacy of MAFR and the merits of long audit firm
tenure (Casterella & Johnston, 2013; Garcia-Blandon et al., 2020; Tepalagul & Lin, 2015).
3.2 Active resistance in the US and the EU
The EU implemented MAFR in 2016 (European Commission, 2014), whereas in 2013 the US
House of Representatives settled the US debate by voting against its implementation (GarciaBlandon et al., 2020; Reid & Carcello, 2017). In both jurisdictions the Big 4 lobby was
influential and, even in the EU where the regulation was adopted, the Big 4 opposition was not
entirely resisted. The finalised rules in the EU were described as “a much-watered down version
of the original proposals” (Horton et al., 2018, p. 991) and “an especially politically-driven
process” that provided a multitude of “fragmented regulatory arrangements” (IFAC, 2017, p.
4) to apply within member states. The European Commissioner for Internal Market and
Services initially advocated strict MAFR rules, which met opposition from the Big 4, who
lobbied politicians in Brussels to dilute them (Horton et al., 2018). In the US the resistance
from the profession achieved even greater success, as the profession received the support of
federal legislators to defeat the efforts of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB) (Reid & Carcello, 2017). The successful lobbying of legislators is what Oliver (1991)
7

calls a highly active manipulation strategy of “co-opting” and “importing influential
constituents” into the regulatory space (Table 1).
3.3 The South African case
3.3.1 Regulation of auditors
An understanding of the historical context is important to properly examine a regulatory space
and its constituent institutional pressures (Canning & O’Dwyer, 2013; Cooper & Robson, 2006;
Hancher & Moran, 1989; MacDonald & Richardson, 2004). Globally, and indeed in South
Africa, auditors enjoyed a quasi-independent system of oversight until a higher degree external
oversight was enforced in the early 2000s (Dowling et al., 2018; Verhoef, 2013). True selfregulation came to an end much earlier in South Africa with the Public Accountants and
Auditors (PAA) Act, Act 51 of 1951 (Gloeck & de Jager, 1994; Verhoef, 2013). Prior to this,
prolonged contestation of regulations by the profession ultimately raised the South African
state’s concerns about the public interest and the unchecked independence of the auditors,
causing the Minister of Finance to initiate state regulation.3 The Public Accountants and
Auditors Board (PAAB) was formed through this legislation as a statutory body authorised to
regulate the profession. The PAAB comprised both state appointees (senior civil servants) and
profession appointees. Over time the various professional bodies representing auditors
consolidated into one body, the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants (SAICA).
This consolidation of power also allowed greater influence of the profession on the PAAB, as
7 of the 11 board members were appointed by the profession (Verhoef, 2013, p. 180). This
status quo was disrupted in the late 1980s when the PAAB became increasingly concerned that
the majority of the accounting profession (represented by the SAICA) were not practicing
auditors and thus should not be so influential in selecting its board members. The PAAB thus
moved to prevent the SAICA from nominating members onto the board, arguing that it needed
to protect its relationship with the state and that audit matters needed to be governed by those
specifically within public practice4.
Nonetheless, given that all auditors were also members of the SAICA, the composition of the
PAAB still gave de facto control to the accounting profession. The funding model was also
dependent on the profession, subjecting the regulatory body to criticism as lacking independent
authority (Gloeck & de Jager, 1994; Verhoef, 2013) - a case of ‘the fox guarding the hen house’
so to speak. Corporate failures in the 1980s and 90s increasingly called the efficacy of the
PAAB into question, both its independence from the profession and its ability to maintain rules
which kept auditors independent from their clients (Gloeck & de Jager, 1994). Despite
concerns, there was strong support globally to retain a measure of self-regulation of auditors.
Allowing auditors to at least partly oversee their profession was touted as efficient, effective
and prudent, with the argument being that only they have the expertise to regulate the
complexities of their field (Paisey & Paisey, 2020; Westermann et al., 2019).
Change came globally following the high-profile Enron-Arthur Andersen scandal in the US
and the subsequent promulgation there of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Dowling et al.,
2018). At this time the South African Minister of Finance initiated a review process that
eventually resulted in the Auditing Profession Act, 26 of 2005 replacing the PAA Act. To instil
3
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further regulatory independence the PAAB was replaced by the Independent Regulatory Board
for Auditors (IRBA), with its board members appointed by the Minister of Finance for a
maximum period of only two years, and its composition restricted to a maximum of 40%
‘registered auditors’ (RSA, 2005, section 11). The funding model was also changed, with IRBA
now partly funded by the National Treasury, rather than wholly by the profession itself (RSA,
2005, section 25)5.
To illustrate the emphasis on independence from the profession, when IRBA began its debate
on MAFR in 2015/2016, its board consisted of eight members, including a chairperson deemed
independent of the audit profession and three registered auditors, one from a medium-sized
firm and two from the Big 4 (IRBA, 2015b). The chairperson was a practicing advocate not an
accountant and, from 2015, an appointed High Court judge. In addition, although the IRBA
CEO (Bernard Agulhas - IRBA’s primary representative in the regulatory space), had some
audit experience, he was never an audit partner, and he was not an IRBA board member. To
maintain the accounting expertise and competency to oversee the audit profession, the Minister
of Finance ensured that all members of the board except the chairperson were professional
accountants registered with the SAICA (as stated, only three were actual auditors). Evidently
the tension here was to balance need for audit expertise with that of maintaining independence
from the interests of auditors, especially the Big 4.
3.3.2 The legacy of apartheid
As it will become relevant to our examination of the discourse surrounding the South African
MAFR debate, the period prior to 1994 was dominated by the apartheid system of oppressive
racial segregation. Thereafter, starting with the democratic election of Nelson Mandela as
President, the government began a process of “dismantling” apartheid (Hammond, Clayton, &
Arnold, 2009, p. 705). Specifically, the government implemented a wide-ranging policy, called
‘Black Economic Empowerment’ (Clark & Worger, 2016; RSA, 2013), or ‘transformation’, to
improve opportunities and reverse apartheid’s inequalities, to create a more equitable, diverse
and inclusive society.6 These policies are not universally supported by all political parties
represented in Parliament, including the main opposition party7.
3.3.3 The MAFR debate
We now describe the timeline and process of the South African MAFR debate. Following the
2014 EU ruling in favour of MAFR (European Commission, 2014), and in response to
perceived deterioration in audit quality in South Africa, IRBA initiated a consultation process
in 2015 with a “research and pre-scoping phase” running from July 2015 to May 2016,
alongside private meetings with various “key stakeholders and stakeholder groupings” (IRBA,
2017a, p. 12). Following this “the board resolved after due process and consultation” that
legislating MAFR was the required (IRBA, 2017a, p. 2).

5

According to IRBA’s 2015 annual financial statements, approximately 36% of revenue was from government funding, 35%
from registration, license and related fees from auditors, and 25% from fees paid to cover practice reviews (inspection fees).
6
From this point we will refer to this race-based economic empowerment policy as ‘transformation’, as it is commonly
referred to in South Africa. The South Africa government employs legislated race categories for economic empowerment
policies, comprising (in addition to ‘white’) those races oppressed and disadvantaged under apartheid namely, ‘African
black’, ‘Coloured’, and ‘Indian/Asian’, all referred to simply as ‘black’ (Clark & Worger, 2016; RSA, 2013).
7
Since 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) has been the ruling party in parliamentary, winning 62% of the votes in
the last election (2019). The Democratic Alliance (DA), the largest opposition party, are opposed to the economic
‘transformation’ policies enacted by the ANC (Clark & Worger, 2016).
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On 25 October 2016 IRBA released its official ‘Consultation Paper’, requesting ‘affected
parties’ to submit response (comment) letters to IRBA by 20 January 2017 (IRBA, 2016b). In
this Consultation Paper IRBA presented its case for MAFR, expressing a desire to follow the
direction of the EU rather than the US. Following the submission deadline for comment on the
Consultation Paper, two ‘public hearings’ on MAFR were held in Cape Town at the South
African Houses of Parliament (on 15 February 2017 and 17 March 2017), before the National
Assembly Standing Committee on Finance (SCoF). As a committee of Parliament, comprised
of elected Members of Parliament from at least four political parties, the SCoF is responsible
for oversight of National Treasury, as well as statutory entities such as IRBA8. The SCoF has
no operational relationship with IRBA, no representation on the IRBA board and has never
systematically considered or debated IRBA’s regulatory role. The SCoF involvement followed
a decision by “the Chairman of SCoF [who] agreed to host parliamentary hearings on MAFR
to support the process of consultation” (IRBA, 2017a, p. 20).
On 15 February 2017 the following organisations presented at the hearing (in order):
IRBA CEO; CFO Forum; SAICA, King Committee; IFAC; KPMG and Deloitte (Big 4); Nkonki
(mid-sized ‘black owned’ audit firm)
At the hearing on 17 March 2017 (in order):
IRBA CEO; EY and PwC (Big 4); Association of Black Accountants in Southern Africa
(ABASA); RSM (mid-sized audit firm); South African Reserve Bank (SARB); Black Chartered
Accountants Practitioners (BCAP); Ngubane & Co (small ‘black owned’ audit firm)
After each presentation there was a brief opportunity for questioning by the members of the
SCoF, addressed to either the respective presenter or the IRBA CEO. As evident from the
selected presenters, opportunity was primarily given to the audit profession (Big 4 and others),
as well as two other interest groups namely, capital market interests and representatives of black
professional accountants.
Only two weeks after the hearings, the IRBA board resolved in meeting (on 28 March 2017) in
favour of officially adopting MAFR into law. After consultation with the Minister of Finance
the decision was publicly communicated in June 2017 by Government Gazette (IRBA, 2017c),
as required by the Auditing Profession Act. IRBA was satisfied and described the consultation
process as “robust” (IRBA, 2017a, p. 12). We note that, in contrast to the EU ruling, the
regulation was issued as it had originally been intended by the regulator (i.e., without
compromise), requiring all public-interest entities, including exchange-listed companies, to
rotate audit firms every 10 years. Affected organisations are expected to implement audit firm
replacements before April 2023.

8

The SCoF comprises 11 members in total, including the chairperson. At the February hearing there were ten members of
the SCoF present and only four at the March hearing. The lack of participation of the members of the SCoF to either be
present at the March hearing or to actively engage in the debate was noticed by the observers and participants present at the
hearings (including an author of this paper in attendance). Most of the engagement with the SCoF was with its chairperson,
Yunus Carrim.
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4. Qualitative method employed
To address the paper’s objective of extending our understandings of the strategic mobilization
of appeals to ‘the public interest’ and interpretation of the audit regulator’s mandate in a
disputed regulatory space, we conduct a qualitative analysis of various communications
constituting the discourse from 2015 until the ruling in June 2017.
4.1 Description of the data
Documentation by way of minutes or transcripts of the private meetings held with stakeholders
by IRBA were not provided to the authors despite requests for such evidence. We were however
able to understand the process and nature of such discussions through our interview with the
IRBA CEO (Bernard Agulhas) in November 20169 which informed our selection of the
organisations to contact. After the 20 January 2017 submission deadline, we then contacted the
relevant organisations separately to obtain copies of their letters submitted in response to the
IRBA Consultation Paper (listed in Table 2). Therefore, these comment letters can be
considered to represent the views of ‘key actors’ prior to the Parliamentary hearings. The
organisations represented in Table 2 cover the Big 4 firms who represent, in our view, primary
actors in opposition to IRBA, plus key representatives of capital market interests, the local
accounting professional body (SAICA) and the international accounting professional body
(IFAC). The length of the response letters ranged from six to 21 pages and were authored by
an executive leader of each respective organisation. We could not obtain any comment letters
from the smaller (non-Big 4) firms, nor any from the organisations representing ‘black’
professionals (BCAP and ABASA). However, representatives of these bodies presented at the
hearings before the SCoF, from which we have the hearing minutes, official audio recordings
and our own field notes of the hearings. We thus believe this data is sufficient to represent the
views of all key organisational stakeholders in the discourse.

9

This interview was conducted by one of the authors and was designed to better understand the IRBA consultative process
and seek further clarity on the regulator’s interpretation of key meanings and its mandate.
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Table 2: Response (comment) letters obtained
Organisation

Author (with citation)

Big 4 audit firms:
 PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) South Africa
 Ernst & Young (EY) South Africa

CEO, PwC South Africa (PwC, 2017)
Professional Practice Director, EY South
Africa (EY, 2017)

 Deloitte South Africa

CEO, Deloitte Africa (Deloitte, 2017)

 KPMG South Africa

CEO, KPMG South Africa (KPMG, 2017)

Professional accounting bodies:
 The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC)
Primary global professional body.
 The South African Institute of Chartered Accountants
(SAICA)
Primary local professional body.
Other key organisations:
 The Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE)10
Primary South African stock exchange.

CEO, The IFAC (IFAC, 2017)
CEO, The SAICA (SAICA, 2017)

CEO, The JSE (JSE, 2016)

 The Chief Financial Officer’s Forum (CFO Forum)
Association comprising the CFOs of JSE-listed
companies.
 The Association for Savings and Investment South
Africa (ASISA)
Association representing all large investment
management companies in South Africa.
 The Banking Association of South Africa (BASA)
The mandated industry representative/trade
association of all licensed commercial banks operating
in South Africa.

Chair of the forum (CFO Forum, 2016)

CEO, The ASISA (ASISA, 2017)

Managing Director, The BASA (BASA,
2017)

The Consultation Paper represents the primary articulation of IRBA’s argument. This document
outlines (1) IRBA’s reasons for pursuing MAFR and (2) IRBA’s understanding of its mandate.
We supplement this data source with other IRBA communications namely, IRBA’s strategic
plan, which was released concurrently with the MAFR debate, newsletters issued and other
relevant IRBA communiques. This allows us to understand and interpret how the regulator
views its mandate and key meanings central to the regulation (Canning & O’Dwyer, 2013;
Hancher & Moran, 1989; MacDonald & Richardson, 2004). We pay careful attention to
examine how IRBA (and then other actors) employ ‘public interest’ rhetoric, together with
related key meanings such as ‘independence’ and ‘audit quality’.
One of this paper’s authors attended both hearings in Cape Town in February and March 2017
and allowed us to observe the proceedings and take field notes. This provided a means of
documenting observations of actors in the space and the capturing of contextual information,
such as the ‘tone’ of discussions, which would not otherwise have been discernible in the data.
Observers were disallowed electronic recording devices in the chambers of the South African
Parliament, but official audio recordings were obtained from the committee secretariat office,
10

The JSE letter included both the position of the JSE itself, as well as a summary of responses received from 63 JSE-listed
companies who provided their views on MAFR to the JSE.
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as were the minutes. Finally, to supplement these data sources, interview and survey data was
obtained from researchers who had conducted a detailed review of auditor and audit committee
views on MAFR11. The data from this source were as follows:




Interviews with 14 JSE-listed company audit committee members;
Interviews with 14 senior audit partners; and
Written comments obtained from surveys of auditors (112 participants) and audit
committee chairs (41 participants) of JSE-listed companies

These interviews and surveys were conducted to determine individual practitioner views on the
IRBA Consultation Paper. The criteria for inclusion in the interviews and survey was direct
affiliation with JSE-listed companies impacted by MAFR, i.e., they were either the auditor of
a JSE-listed company, or a member of its audit committee (often the chair). The auditors
comprised both Big 4 and non-Big 4 firm partners. In total it comprises qualitative data from
29 interviews and 153 survey participants. Some of the interviews and all the surveys, were
conducted after the IRBA ruling in June 2017.
Each participant was asked (in either the interview or survey) whether they agreed with IRBA’s
position as communicated in the Consultation Paper and to comment on how they perceived
the consultative process driven by the IRBA until the ruling announcement in June 2017. As
such, this data presents a rich source of information concerning individual practitioner
perspectives, to supplement our examination of organisational responses. This data is
considered secondary to the data which contains the discourse between actors ‘within’ the
regulatory space. The individual practitioners did not themselves engage the regulator directly.
Nonetheless, given the seniority and roles (auditor and audit committee members) of these
participants, they were no doubt influential voices within their respective organisations (audit
firms and JSE-listed companies) and thus indirectly influenced the regulatory space. We
believe that this data of influential ‘outsiders’ to the regulatory space may be insightful to
inform our interpretation of the discourse.
Figure 2 illustrates the timeline of the regulatory debate and the data collection.
Figure 2: Events and data collection timeline

11

This interview and survey data has resulted in the following publications - Harber and Maroun (2020) and Harber, Marx
and De Jager (2020). These papers focus on a distinctly different research agenda i.e., understanding participants views on
the cost-benefits of MAFR. Our purpose is to understand their views on the consultation process itself and IRBA’s
motivations.
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4.2 Method of analysis
The data were analysed in a sequential manner corresponding to the timeline of the debate
(Figure 2). Beginning with the Consultation Paper, supported by other IRBA communications,
we categorised the core argument being articulated by IRBA, surrounding key terms and
associated meanings such as ‘audit quality’, ‘auditor independence’, ‘transformation’ and ‘the
public interest’. All discourse surrounding IRBA mandate interpretations were also extracted.
Actor rhetoric was constructed around these key meanings which, although first extracted from
the Consultation Paper, were developed iteratively as further data, especially that of counter
voices to the IRBA position, such as that expressed by the Big 4, were examined. The view of
the government was represented by the members of the SCoF, most notably the expressions of
its chairperson (Yunus Carrim).
The data from the public hearings then allowed us then to determine the following:
(1) Whether the IRBA argument at the hearings differed from that laid out in the
Consultation Paper;
(2) The views of the SCoF, as democratically elected members of parliament, and as
chaired by a senior ruling party member; and
(3) Whether the views of the representatives of ‘black’ audit professionals (e.g., BCAP,
ABASA and Nkonki), supported the IRBA position.
Our intention here was to also capture and understand counter opinions to the narrative of the
dominant voices in the discourse, these dominant voices coming from IRBA, the Big 4 and the
capital-market interests. There is a noticeable absence in the data we obtained of the views of
‘non-Big 4’ audit firms in the discourse. Only three such audit firms (Nkonki, Ngubane & Co
and RSM) presented their positions to the SCoF during the hearings, and we failed to obtain
any response letters from such firms. However, of the 14 partner interviews, nine were
conducted with ‘mid-sized’, non-Big 4 audit partners (i.e., Grant Thornton, Mazars and BDO),
six of whom were managing partners of their respective national firm networks. These data
sources serve as our data to examine the positioning of the mid-size firms in the regulatory
space negotiations (refer to section 5.6)12.
We present our analysis in the next section by first outlining IRBA’s argument for MAFR, as
established by their Consultation Paper. This sets the parameters of key meanings and logic
disputed within the space (Hancher & Moran, 1989; MacDonald & Richardson, 2004). We pay
specific attention to the use of ‘public interest rhetoric’ and the deployment of what is
traditionally understood as ‘serving the public interest’ i.e., the production of high audit quality.
In addition, the manner in which IRBA interprets, and in this case has extended its mandate, is
of vital importance to the regulatory space conception of how regulatory alignment and
consensus is achieved (Hancher & Moran, 1989; Scott, 2001). We will then discuss the
opposition to, or support for, the IRBA position expressed by different actors as the debate
progressed. Following the analysis, we offer a conclusion, outlining the contribution of the
paper in relation to the existing literature and theoretical framework adopted.

12

As the MAFR regulation is designed only for large organisations and JSE-listed companies, many of the non-Big 4 firms
recognise that they are too small to compete for such engagements. This explains the limited participation of the smaller of
the non-Big 4 firms in the debate.
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5. Analysis of regulatory discourse
5.1 The IRBA positioning
Effectively we find that the IRBA establishes its position in favour of MAFR on its evidence
and reasoning that audit quality is in decline in South Africa, which it attributes to compromised
independence between audit firms and their clients (IRBA, 2016b). Consistent with the policy
reform in the EU effective in 2016, IRBA motivates for the need to move beyond the more
traditional partner-only rotation rules currently legislated in the South African Companies Act
(No 71 of 2008).
Whereas IRBA, through its ‘mandate extension’ imposes a secondary objective into the
discourse (discussed below), which was disputed by actors in the space, the Consultation Paper
did not emphasise these objectives. Rather, IRBA here confined its argument to the regulatory
logic outlined in Figure 1 i.e., the regulation was intended to improve audit quality by limiting
audit firm tenures, to address concerns over auditor independence. The secondary objective
surrounding ‘transformation’ (race equality), was brought (we argue strategically) to the fore
in the parliamentary hearings before the SCoF. We first discuss the primary IRBA argument in
the Consultation Paper.
IRBA believes that South Africa is experiencing a decline in audit quality, evidenced by highprofile local corporate failures13 and findings from regulatory audit inspections (practice
reviews). The 2015/16 regulatory inspections of audit work indicated a trend of adverse
findings, which continued in the years following the June 2017 ruling. The IRBA attributed
this deterioration to long audit firm-client relationships (IRBA, 2019c, 2019a). As further
evidence IRBA cited the decline in global ranking of South Africa’s in categories of audit
quality and corporate governance by the World Economic Forum (WEF)14.
The IRBA Consultation Paper aligned very closely to the MAFR logic (Figure 1) in attributing
causal effects. The “familiarity threats between auditors and audit committee chairs, and
auditors and Chief Financial Officers (CFOs)” was impairing auditor independence and
professional scepticism (IRBA, 2016b, p. 5). These threats were borne from, and grew with,
long audit firm tenures, and therefore it is this tenure that needed to be regulated. The
Consultation Paper contained a table of JSE-listed companies, together with their respective
audit firm tenures (IRBA, 2016b, p. 18). Thirty companies had not rotated auditors in over 20
years (all Big 4 firms), with two companies having had the same audit firm for over 100 years.
IRBA also argued there to be a systemic problem of JSE companies appointing non-executive
directors (often also acting as audit committee members) who had a prior relationship with the
company’s incumbent Big 4 audit firm. Often these directors had worked at these Big 4 firms
or were even retired partners from these firms.
IRBA attempted to show that the profession has lost legitimacy on grounds (and using ‘key
meanings’) that were well-established within the regulatory space, namely ‘audit quality’
13

Recent examples of South African corporate scandals include Steinhoff International Holdings (in 2017),
Oakbay Investments (in 2016), African Bank Investments (in 2014) and VBS Mutual Bank (in 2018), among others. In each
of these cases the auditor is accused of compromised independence and, in some cases, complicity in fraud with
management.
14
In 2015 and 2016 the WEF Global Competitiveness Reports ranked South Africa 1st and 3rd respectively (of approx.140
countries) for “Strength of auditing and reporting standards” and “Efficacy of corporate boards”. In 2018, this had slipped to
55th and 34th respectively (WEF, 2018).
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decline and ‘independence’ compromise. As actors interact within a regulatory space, various
aspects of the discourse are important in determining regulatory alignment outcomes. Firstly,
the actors must be perceived by the regulator, society and other influential stakeholders (such
as government authorities) to be legitimate according to established values (Hancher & Moran,
1989; Power, 2003; Scott, 2001). This was the first major obstacle for the Big 4 firms – they
needed to defend their professional legitimacy to deliver audit quality and act as independent
professionals without a policy reform. Audit quality was a non-negotiable established value.
Furthermore, it was clear and relatively undisputed that IRBA had the legislative authority in
terms of the Auditing Professions Act to set the debate parameters15 (Hancher & Moran, 1989;
Scott, 2001), as long as the parameters were confined to audit quality outcomes in the public
interest. The contestation did not involve IRBA’s regulative authority per se, but rather the
fundamental questions of (1) whether audit quality was indeed in decline and then, as would
become more influential as the debate progressed to the public hearings, (2) the legitimacy of
adding race-based objectives to the discourse.
As a subtle but, we believe, deliberate tactic, care was taken by IRBA in the early stages of the
debate, as expressed in the Consultation Paper, to describe both investors and ‘the public’ as
the beneficiaries of improving audit quality. IRBA clearly articulated that both capital market
interests and those of broader society were priorities in the MAFR regulation.
South Africa relies substantially on external capital… foreign direct
investment… and a well-regulated and reliable capital market… [requiring] a
reputable audit profession… on which investment decisions can be made
(IRBA, 2016b, p. 4).
This neo-liberal perspective was often incorporated with a more social democratic perspective
of the wider public/society. The two groups (investors and ‘the public’) were often conflated
without acknowledgement of potential conflict of interest concerning MAFR outcomes, for
example:
The IRBA considers the development of [audit quality] to be in the public
interest as it aims to improve the protection of the investing public from
potential audit failures that might result in substantial financial losses for
investors (IRBA, 2016b, p. 7).
As we now discuss, this conflating of interests allowed, at least in part, the regulator’s change
to an ‘extended mandate’ that sought to broaden IRBA’s ambit and justify its inclusion of
additional societal values into the MAFR discourse.
5.2 The extension of the regulatory mandate
According to the regulatory space conceptualisation, not only must the actors be perceived as
legitimate, and there be agreement on key meanings surrounding the regulatory logic, but there
must also be consensus over interpretation of the regulatory mandate itself. The mandate sets
debate parameters, especially in the early stages of the discourse (Canning & O’Dwyer, 2013;
15

Some comment letters showed contestation of the legal right of an audit regulator to pursue legislation binding on
companies, as this was argued to be within the purview of the Companies Act, not the Auditing Professions Act, and thus
outside IRBA’s jurisdiction (e.g., ASISA, 2017; PwC, 2017). However, this argument was not pervasive nor influential in the
discourse.
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Cooper & Robson, 2006; MacDonald & Richardson, 2004). Influential actors may “severely
test” the regulator’s own legitimacy and “actively seek to restrict the interpretation of the
regulators’ mandate in order to dilute their regulatory powers” (Canning & O’Dwyer, 2013, p.
171). What we find is that the profession was wholly unable to do this. In fact, the opposite
occurred - rather than a dilution of the regulator’s legitimacy, the regulator was able to use its
interpretation of its mandate to surprise the profession, change the paradigm of the debate and
effectively and fundamentally challenge the Big 4’s legitimacy.
Whereas a high degree of regulatory consensus was achieved in 1951 with the PAAB, that
disintegrated over the MAFR dispute in 2015/16. Acting parallel (chronologically) with the
consultation process, IRBA published its ‘extended mandate’, to provide “a more
comprehensive regulatory model” in the form of a revised ‘strategic plan’ (IRBA, 2016a, p.
iii). Using a form of ‘public interest’ rhetoric IRBA re-interpreted its mandate during the period
of the MAFR regulatory discourse. We interpret that the timing of this re-interpretation of the
mandate was deliberate and strategically concomitant with its promotion of MAFR. By doing
so it evaded the attentions of the Big 4 until later in the debate.
The extended mandate, expressed within the ‘strategic pillars’ of IRBA in its newly published
Strategic Plan (2016-2021) was as follows:
To influence transformation in the auditing profession {and thereby} to retain
Black auditors in the profession, attract Black auditors back into the profession
and address the imbalance in the demographic representation in the auditing
profession (IRBA, 2016a, p. i, iv, 2017a, p. 2)
IRBA justified this pillar as fundamental to restore confidence in the auditing profession. We
refer to this change as unilateral because it was not the outcome of any legislative or democratic
process16. IRBA thus unilaterally changed its mandate and communicated it to the profession.
As a state-appointed statutory body, this mandate extension is a move beyond its statutory
parameters of maintaining audit quality. IRBA showed its intention to regulate more than
simply audit quality, now describing itself as a ‘comprehensive regulator’, and turning its focus
specifically to racial equity, consistent with state policy of ‘transformation’. These additional
‘functions’ or ‘objectives’ of IRBA are not contained in the Auditing Profession Act, where
IRBA’s purpose is confined “to promote the integrity of the auditing profession” and “take
steps it considers necessary to protect the public in their dealings with registered auditors”
(RSA, 2005, section 4). From this wording it is presumed that IRBA believes it may change its
mandate so long as it prescribes to the logic of protecting ‘the public interest’.
IRBA used this mandate extension to drive its race-equity agenda within the MAFR debate, but
it did so rather subtly at first. The Consultation Paper certainly stated that transformation was
a perceived benefit of MAFR, yet it emphasised the established regulatory logic (Figure 1) as
primary.
[IRBA] concedes that the MAFR rule on its own will not achieve all the
transformation objectives required in the South African context; however, it
can contribute to building capacity. (IRBA, 2016b, p. 19)
16

The IRBA Strategic Plan document published stated the intention to obtain approval from the Minister of Finance and
legislate it within “the next 5 years” (IRBA, 2016a, p. iii).
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Notably, the profession does not appear to have actively resisted the mandate extension itself
when it was communicated in 2015/16. We attribute this to (1) the need to maintain legitimacy
and seek consensus within the regulatory space; and (2) the manner in which, as described,
IRBA published its changed mandate interpretation i.e., without external consultation or
official government sanction. Many see the transformation ideals in South Africa as a test of
ethical corporate conduct. All the audit firms have over many years, supported “black economic
empowerment’ in principle. The Big 4 were well aware of “the way the wind [was] blowing”
in politics (Cochran, 1974, p. 328) and we believe, at this point in the discourse, they were
relieved that the debate over MAFR was largely confined to its regulatory logic.
The extended mandate now prompted IRBA to bring its transformation agenda to the fore:
MAFR will promote transformation by creating more opportunities for small
and mid-tier audit firms to enter certain markets, provided they are competent
to audit in those markets (IRBA, 2015, p. 2)
The logic here is that MAFR, by forcing audit firm rotation, would contribute to a more
equitable race representation in the audit profession as the smaller firms are given the
opportunity to be appointed as auditors of JSE listed companies. Breaking the dominance of
the Big 4 audit firms was argued to be in the public’s best interest, as it would allow a greater
number of ‘black’ accounting professionals to participate. Some of the smaller (non-Big 4)
firms are considered ‘more transformed’ than the Big 4, meaning they comprise a higher
proportion of black accountants17. Importantly, within the framework of its extended mandate,
IRBA believes that transforming the race demographics of the profession is its responsibility
and is in the public interest.
As the regulator, and with the public interest at heart, we have a responsibility
to address all these concerns [i.e., transformation and market concentration,
as well as audit quality] (IRBA, 2019b, p. 2).
Interestingly, this ‘transformation objective’ for MAFR is prefaced on a desire for greater
competition (and lower supply concentration) in the audit market. This market concentration
benefit (but not linked to race equity) was a promoted benefit of MAFR in the EU debate
(European Commission, 2014; Horton et al., 2018)18.
The IRBA positioned itself ideologically with the government and beyond the scope of
regulating audit quality exclusively. As described by the IRBA CEO in a 2017 IRBA
newsletter:
…the harsh reality is that of the 4,283 registered auditors in South Africa,
74.8% are white and only 10.5% are black Africans. We believe that, while
some initiatives have been implemented, more must be done… it is about giving
black accountants and auditors long-term prospects in the profession –
prospects that are equivalent to those of their counterparts. This requires a
17

IRBA offered no evidence to support this claim.
The European Commission refers to how MAFR rules “help to foster diversity in the audit markets and enhance investors'
trust” (European Commission, 2014, Audit reform in the EU section para. 3).
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cultural shift and a more inclusive approach… it is about financial inclusion,
ownership and access to markets and opportunities (IRBA, 2017b, p. 2)
We argue that IRBA tactically positioned itself through its ‘covert’ mandate extension. The
transformation agenda was deliberately de-emphasised in the Consultation paper where IRBA
rather chose to emphasise the regulatory logic and its socio-democratic role to secure public
values. The focus on race was then introduced in the public hearings to leverage the support of
government via the SCoF. In effect the ‘market failure’ by the profession to secure ‘public
values’ was then interpreted within a ‘race equity’ paradigm, consistent with the ruling party’s
political agenda. Here we see the societal and historical context impact the regulatory space
and the ‘rules of the game’ (Cooper & Robson, 2006; Spence et al., 2017). This re-alignment
allowed IRBA to position itself as the ‘regulator of politically mandated ethical conduct’ rather
than simply audit quality. We interpret this as a significant departure from the function and role
of audit regulators globally.
5.3 Key organisational responses to the Consultation Paper
The structure and logic of the response letters were in accordance with that of the Consultation
Paper to which they were responding. As shown in Table 3, there was overwhelming pushback
by certain key organisational stakeholders against IRBA’s position. The strongest opposition
was expressed by the Big 4 firms, who argued that IRBA had not effectively demonstrated that
audit quality was in decline.
No empirical evidence has been produced to support the suggestion of a
perceived lack of independence… no ‘so called’ audit failures in South Africa
have been factually attributed [to a compromise of independence] (KPMG,
2017, p. 2)
We do not believe that MAFR increases auditor independence or enhances
audit quality. There is no empirical evidence that it does… The IRBA has not
yet provided the research that evidences that the current independence
measures in South Africa are not working. (PwC, 2017, p. 5)
Table 3: Summary of views in response (comment) letters obtained

Organisation

Supportive
of IRBA
position?

Big 4 audit firms:
 PwC South Africa

No

 EY South Africa

No

 Deloitte South Africa

No

 KPMG South Africa

No

Professional
accounting bodies:
 The IFAC

 The SAICA

Neutral

Neutral/No

Summary

 Strongly opposed to MAFR and the premise that audit quality is in decline.
 Supports the ‘transformation objective’, but not using MAFR.

 “We note that while IRBA has identified audit quality as the key objective for its
mandatory audit firm rotation proposal, other objectives, such as transformation, are
also noted. It is very important that competing objectives do not impede the outcomes
of initiatives.” (IFAC, 2017, p. 2)
 The “demands are for enhanced audit quality” need to be met by a “range of other
measures”, not only auditor rotation (IFAC, 2017, p. 3).
 The SAICA as an institute held a neutral position on MAFR, while reporting that a
survey of its members showed general opposition to IRBA position.
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 Supports the ‘transformation objective’, but not using MAFR.
Other key
organisations:
 The JSE

No

 The CFO Forum

No

 The ASISA

No

 The BASA

No

 The “overwhelming majority” of companies surveyed on the JSE “raise serious
concerns” regarding MAFR (JSE, 2016, p. 1)
 Supports the ‘transformation objective’, but not using MAFR.
 “There is no clear demonstration of the magnitude and extent of research conducted”
to show that auditor independence is a concern (CFO Forum, 2016, p. 1).
 Supports the ‘transformation objective’, but not using MAFR
 “The rationale for the decision of the board of IRBA to implement MAFR is not
expressed in detail… MAFR is unlikely, at least in the short to medium-term period
of a forced rotation cycle, to improve audit quality and/or improve auditor
independence” (ASISA, 2017, p. 2)
 Supports the ‘transformation objective’, but not using MAFR.
 The rotation of auditors should be the responsibility of a company’s board and Audit
Committee, not forced via legislation.
 Supports the ‘transformation objective’, but not using MAFR.

The Big 4 argued that audit quality was not in decline, auditor independence was not
compromised, there were less disruptive and costly policy options to pursue, and transformation
was best progressed by internal firm initiatives. The Big 4 “unreservedly fully embraced the
need to transform” (EY, 2017, p. 8) and thus there was no need to use regulation to mandate
this objective, and certainly not MAFR. Each of the Big 4 firms’ letters went further, claiming
that counter-intentionally MAFR would likely impair audit quality rather than improve it. The
KPMG and EY letters, for example, provided multiple reasons why the implementation of
MAFR would escalate audit firms’ costs, reducing their profitability to such a degree that the
quality of audits would suffer (EY, 2017, p. 12; KPMG, 2017, p. 3-4).
We believe these letters adequately represent the views of the influential actors in opposition
to IRBA, namely the Big 4 and representatives of investor and economic interests in the
regulatory space (e.g., the JSE including CFOs, the banking industry and institutional
investors). A review of these letters shows unanimous opposition to MAFR.
Two other common themes emerged in the letters. There was a pervasive call from the Big 4
and capital market representatives for more extensive research and consultation before reaching
a final decision. The consultation process to date was described as “insufficient and rushed”,
and as described by the JSE, IRBA was ‘strongly urged’ to “start the process of consultation
on MAFR afresh” (JSE, 2016, p. 4). These stakeholders wanted more opportunity to engage
with the regulator. Also, while all letters expressed wholehearted support for IRBA’s
‘transformation objective’, they were against the use of MAFR as a tool to achieve this end.
There was a caution “that competing objectives do not impede the outcomes of initiatives”
(IFAC, 2017, p. 2). Respondents were concerned that the regulator was pursuing ‘multiple
objectives’ with a regulatory tool which was designed exclusively to address threats to
independence caused by extended audit firm tenures.
The public interest will be best served by a more focussed approach to
developing regulation (Deloitte, 2017, p. 2)
5.4 The public hearings before the SCoF
The hearings before the SCoF took place only a few weeks after the Consultation Paper
response deadline at the Houses of Parliament in Cape Town (RSA, 2017a, 2017b). IRBA had
not (and still to date has not) issued formal replies to the response letters. Each session began
with a presentation from the IRBA CEO, followed by short presentations from select invited
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individuals representing key affected organisations, followed by a time of questioning by the
SCoF.
We identify a deliberate change of emphasis when comparing the content of the IRBA
presentation, which initiated each session’s proceedings, with that contained in the
Consultation Paper. Whereas the Consultation Paper emphasised investor protection and the
regulatory logic, the rhetoric of IRBA’s CEO at the SCoF forum, placed the focus on the role
of the regulator in protecting broader society and public values, consistent with its mandate
extension. As an example of this emphasis, the IRBA presentation slides commenced picturing
poor and vulnerable communities and children in South Africa. The IRBA CEO claimed that
MAFR, by improving audit quality and limiting occurrences of corporate misconduct, would
protect public retirement funds and corporate employees. The presentation quickly proceeded
to highlight the potential for MAFR to contribute towards racial transformation – an emphasis
not articulated in the Consultation Paper. We thus argue that IRBA strategically adjusted its
rhetoric to appeal to the political audience.
The Big 4 displayed noticeable frustration with the preoccupation of the SCoF and IRBA with
race considerations19. The chairperson (Yunus Carrim), a senior member of the South African
ruling party, controlled the discourse and interacted the most with presenters. He afforded little
time to the presumably central question of whether MAFR would improve audit quality.
Furthermore, with few exceptions, comments and questions from members of the SCoF were
directed at race transformation and the perceived unwillingness of the Big 4 to take
transformation seriously. The chairperson of the SCoF stated it unequivocally - he “wanted to
see a deconcentration of the market, because South Africa was overly monopolistic, in a racial
form… [I am] not convinced why independence was separate from transformation and market
concentration, because the debate was about transformation whether one likes it or not.”
(RSA, 2017a).
The chairperson furthermore claimed:
It cannot be that 23 years after democracy we still have a sector that is not
transformed…. But also, the government must ensure that through [MAFR]’s
framework it has initiated, there is an increase in the use of black firms for
auditing both in the public and private sectors… As such we want to determine:
to what extent can the [MAFR] facilitate the transformation of the auditing
industry? (RSA, 2017a)
This debate is about transformation. Explain why the primary aim is not related
to the secondary aims? (RSA, 2017a)
Calling for clarity on objectives, the CEO of the SAICA stated that “we need clear research
on what exactly we are concerned about - different objectives should not be mixed.”. In
response, the SCoF chairperson told the Big 4 leadership present: “we are telling you, you have
to move faster on the need to transform” (RSA, 2017b). The IRBA CEO responded, agreeing
that transformation had to “move beyond numbers and begin to empower black accountants
and black-owned auditing firms”.
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This was observed by the author present at both sessions.
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It is perhaps not surprising that most members of the SCoF (at least those in attendance - refer
footnote 8) agreed with the chairperson, as the majority of the SCoF comprise members of the
ruling political party. Those present from the opposition party, while not expressing support for
or against MAFR, did oppose the transformation view of the chairperson, as would be expected
given their respective party ideologies on the matter (refer footnote 7). The chairperson and the
majority of the SCoF were not interested in discussing the merits of MAFR on audit quality
grounds. The platform of the hearings appeared to be an opportunity to rebuke the Big 4 for
poor performance on race transformation. Despite being entrusted with financial oversight, the
SCoF did not appear to share IRBA’s primary concern over audit quality, and the IRBA CEO
evidently understood this. The persistent focus on race equality, and aggressive tone from the
chairperson in particular, accusing the Big 4 executives of unethical behaviour, caught the
profession and the Big 4 executives off guard. IRBA’s CEO was able to use this to IRBA’s
advantage and leverage the support of the SCoF in favour of MAFR.
5.4.1 Defending their legitimacy
Of the Big 4 firms, KPMG and Deloitte were invited to the February session, PwC and EY to
the March session. There was no opportunity for each respective Big 4 executive to make a
second presentation to the SCoF and perhaps adjust their positioning and address the
transformation arguments posed by the SCoF20. The Big 4 attended the sessions intending to
debate MAFR in its merits to improve audit quality, as they had done so in their response letters
to the Consultation Paper. Yet, in response to aggressive questioning from the chairperson of
the SCoF in particular, they had to defend their firms’ performance on transformation. It was
thus transformation rhetoric which established or diminished their legitimacy in this setting.
The Big 4 executives understood the non-negotiable imperative of race transformation and
strategically embraced it throughout the debate. They were evidently well-versed in extolling
their firm’s progress in transformation and this rhetoric was clearly understood as a necessity
to maintain legitimacy within the regulatory space. As discussed, all ten comment letters
reviewed (Table 3), including those defending capital market interests (e.g., the JSE, ASISA,
ABASA), embraced this ideology.
[we are] firmly committed to accelerated transformation, not only within our
own Firm, but also of the profession as a whole (Deloitte, 2017, p. 14)
PwC told the SCoF that the firm was “the most transformed firm” in the industry (RSA, 2017b)
in terms of absolute numbers of black accountants. The retort from the SCoF chairperson to
this comment was that the rate was nonetheless unacceptably slow. Deloitte stated: “we
currently have 45% black representation across our national audit practice” (RSA, 2017b).
KPMG claimed that the Big 4 were “the biggest contributors” to improving race equality in the
profession (KPMG, 2017, p. 21). Not only did the Big 4 claim to be transforming adequately
on their own, MAFR was argued to be an inhibitor of their progress in this regard by disrupting
the industry, distracting auditors and firm leadership, lowering profitability in the industry (to
loss-making levels) and undermining the profession’s appeal to young black accountants.21
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As a subjective comment, the author present at both sessions did notice that the CEOs of PwC and EY, having heard about
what transpired at the first session in February, were more prepared (and less off guard) to engage on transformation.
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These were arguments contained within each Big 4 firm response letter.
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The impact on the transformation agenda could also be acute. In a market
where the retention of skilled black professionals is a challenge, such measures
may only serve to make the profession that much less attractive. With the
increased pressure on audit fees and staff compensation, audit firms are
already challenged to retain top talent with better prospects being offered in
other markets and other industries (PwC, 2017, p. 3)
IRBA placed the profession in a difficult position. Race equality is a dearly held public value
by many in South Africa, as well as being a national government policy objective. All actors in
the debate had to, on the one hand, not only embrace this ideal, but show objective evidence of
progress. On the other hand, those opposed to MAFR argued that the regulation would not
promote transformation. We argue that by embracing transformation, even if disputing MAFR,
the profession has conceded that race equality is an audit market ideal ‘in the public interest’.
Even ASISA, the representative of institutional investors, i.e. capital market interests,
acknowledged this (ASISA, 2017, p. 1). All actors in the regulatory space agreed (at least
publicly) with the South African government that auditors, in their quest to serve the public
interest, can not only deliver high audit quality outcomes, but must also deliver race equity
outcomes. This is a development beyond the traditional understanding of auditors acting in the
public interest through delivering audit quality outcomes (Francis, 2004; IESBA, 2018;
Knechel et al., 2013).
5.5 The views of smaller audit firms and representatives of black professionals
As it was impossible to obtain response letters from the ‘mid-tier’ firms, the presentations from
the three non-Big 4 firms (Nkonki, RSM and Ngubane & Co.) at the hearings provide insight
into how these ‘next tier’ firms view the IRBA position. These are the firms that presumably
stand to gain from MAFR, as they compete for appointment from companies previously audited
by the Big 4.
RSM is an international firm network, while Nkonki and Ngubane & Co are referred to as
‘black-owned’ firms (i.e., black audit partners). Interestingly, RSM’s presentation aligned with
that of the Big 4, despite the potential for the policy to allow RSM to grow market share.
However, Nkonki and Ngubane & Co expressed support for MAFR, together with the two
organisations representing black accountants: the Advancement of Black Accountants in
Southern Africa (ABASA) and the Black Chartered Accountants Practitioners (BCAP)22. These
organisations argued that the increased competition, and the resulting growth of their blackowned firms, would improve both transformation and audit quality in the profession. MAFR
would grow its pool of black professionals and create more competition for the Big 4, both
factors being beneficial for audit quality. The SCoF chairperson expressly agreed with the
following reasoning from BCAP:
“we can break the dominance of the [Big 4 and create] a way of black firms
getting access to private sector audits, levelling the playing field and lessening
the concentration of the market” (BCAP chair)
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The acting chairperson of BCAP (Victor Sekese), who presented the BCAP position before the SCoF, was the CEO of the
largest black-owned audit firm in the country, SizweNtsalubaGobodo (SNG). It is thus likely that the views expressed by the
BCAP are consistent with those of SNG.
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The Big 4 counterargued that forcing transformation through an ill-suited regulation would
counter intentionally inhibit the ability of their firms to achieve their race equity goals and make
the profession less profitable and less appealing to aspiring black professionals. Inability to
retain such talent would impair audit quality in the longer term.
5.6 The views of practitioners outside the regulatory space
The interview and survey data provides an opportunity to understand the views of individual
auditors and audit committee chairs, being those ‘outside’ of the regulatory space. The data,
consistent with the Big 4 positioning, presents overwhelming opposition to MAFR. Adhering
closely to the regulatory logic, the practitioners argue that the primary benefit of MAFR (i.e.,
improved independence) does not outweigh its costs, most notably the loss of client-specific
expertise. As race and audit firm size identifiers were collected in the data, we are able to
determine that surprisingly, the majority of ‘black’ participants also did not support MAFR.
This indicates that the ‘black’ professional representation in the regulatory space by
organisations such as BCAP and ABASA may not represent the consensus of individual black
auditors. Audit practitioners (of all race identities) preferred to promote transformation through
internal firm initiatives rather than legislation and were concerned of the impact of MAFR on
talent retention. This data again indicates widespread support for race equality in the profession,
but not by way of MAFR.
The interview and survey data was not originally collected to understand views on the
regulatory debate process (see, Harber & Maroun, 2020; Harber, Marx, & De Jager, 2020) and
hence the ability to draw conclusions for our purposes is limited. Nonetheless, the comments
raised in the interviews and surveys clearly demonstrate dissatisfaction with the perceived
intentions of IRBA and the manner in which the consultation was handled. The practitioners
believed that “biased political ambitions”, rather than a bone fide pursuit of audit quality, drove
the IRBA agenda, as illustrated by these separate practitioner comments:
The regulator steam-rolled this through! (Auditor)
The IRBA has been "captured". (Auditor)
MAFR is political! (Auditor)
Independence was used in an effort to push transformation. (Audit committee
chair)
IRBA's dishonesty in relation to MAFR has undermined its integrity, as well as
the reputation of a profession build on honesty and transparency. (Audit
committee chair)
The participants evidently took great exception to the consultative process followed by the
IRBA. Furthermore, there was a pervasive view that the politics of transformation, as congruent
with the government’s ‘black economic empowerment’ agenda, heavily influenced IRBA. One
participant described the whole consultation process as a “façade”, designed only to have the
appearance of legitimacy. It was clear that the audit industry and its stakeholders desired more
robust and honest debate from the regulator before a final decision was made. This was not
granted. Following what can only be described as overwhelming opposition to the regulation
from the Big 4 firms and capital market interests, IRBA issued its ruling two months after the
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March 2017 hearing, after receiving approval from the Minister, officially ending the regulatory
debate.
6. Concluding discussion
This paper has examined how the South African audit regulator successfully positioned itself
to resist Big 4 efforts to prevent highly disruptive reform. Our purpose is to exhibit the selfinterested behaviour of key actors, together with the specific strategies, rationales, and
resources they mobilize within the regulatory space. In so doing we contribute to
understandings of the meaning and use of the term ‘the public interest’ and explore differing
interpretations of the audit regulator’s mandate. As evidence of audit quality decline mounts,
regulatory debate is becoming more contested and politically motivated. The Big 4 tend to be
successful in re-shaping the profession to suit their commercialist interests and influence reform
in their favour, by employing what Oliver (1991) refers to as ‘active strategies of resistance’.
The MAFR debates in the EU and the US are cases in point, with the Big 4 and capital market
interests actively and successfully co-opting political support to their cause. The literature
indicates that the ‘powerful actors’ in opposition to regulators usually succeed in their quest to
‘water down’, if not abandon, proposed regulations (Horton et al., 2018; Malsch & Gendron,
2011; Shapiro & Matson, 2008).
In this South African case study, we find that the Big 4, who were understandably concerned
about the impact the regulation would have on their market dominance and profitability, were
unable to overtly resist nor subtly influence regulatory intentions. They were wholly
unsuccessful at infiltrating, lobbying or influencing the regulator. Evidently, the engagement
in the regulatory space was highly combative, with little common ground reached before the
ruling. Legislative changes to the composition of the oversight body of the regulator and (less
so) its funding model, limited the ability of the Big 4 to influence the outcome. The regulator
was able to detach itself to some degree from audit and capital market interests at a governance
level, which also enabled it to unilaterally change its interpretation of its legislative mandate.
IRBA capitalised on the ‘ambiguity’ inherent in the ‘public interest’ principle defining its
mandate (Hancher & Moran, 1989; MacDonald & Richardson, 2004). This was tactically done
concurrently with the MAFR debate and thus diverted attention and diluted challenge from
opposition. This revision strategically provisioned race-based objectives within its purview,
extending the regulator’s jurisdiction beyond merely maintenance of audit quality. The
framework of Oliver (1991) identifies this as an active manipulate strategy through influencing
the values and criteria of the debate. IRBA did this in a manner which skirted the need for
explicit approval from the Minister of Finance or amendment to the Auditing Profession Act.
The public hearings were instrumental in demonstrating to the profession how the debate had
shifted on MAFR, at least as far as the government was concerned, towards a focus on securing
the public value of race equality. This surprised the profession. The tactic of co-opting the
support of the SCoF on a political issue had the effect of challenging both the norms of the
regulatory space and the ethical legitimacy of the Big 4 (Oliver, 1991). Arguments provided at
the public hearings that appealed to the logic of MAFR were side-lined as the profession was
accused of a superficial (or at least insufficient) commitment to achieving race equality. IRBA
was thus successful in attaching race equality and fair competition to the MAFR debate and
indeed bringing it to the fore. From this point the profession had little room for active resistance,
confined to formulating arguments which largely fell on deaf ears, and with no further
opportunity afforded them by the regulator to revise their approach. By importing political
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support from the ruling party and playing to their dominant political ideology, IRBA was
emboldened to justify ending the debate abruptly after the public hearings, indeed without even
providing formal response to the response letters requested in the Consultation Paper.
Despite coming from what some may perceive as a legitimacy deficient position, given the
evidence of audit quality decline and slow rate of transformation, we find evidence that the Big
4 were nonetheless also able to mount defiance and manipulation strategies against the
regulator. As demonstrated by Canning and O’Dwyer (2013) in Ireland, active strategies of
resistance can be employed by both the profession and the regulator. The Big 4 used co-opt and
challenge tactics (Oliver, 1991), aligning with influential capital market interests to resist
MAFR and challenging IRBA’s pursuit of multiple objectives, its flawed reasoning,
insufficient evidence and rushed consultation process. These strategies used by both sides are
“intended to actively change or exert power over the content of the expectations themselves or
the sources that seek to express or enforce them” (Oliver, 1991, p. 157).
The failure to reach consensus and apparent industry-wide unhappiness at the political
motivations and flawed consultation process, may seriously impede the success of the
regulation’s adoption. The prioritisation of politics over regulatory logic was a continual
frustration for both actors within and observers outside the regulatory space. Attacks on actor
legitimacy and conflicted interpretations of key meanings are unlikely to foster successful
regulatory outcomes (Canning & O’Dwyer, 2013; Hancher & Moran, 1989; MacDonald &
Richardson, 2004).
South Africa provides a unique historical and societal context, with both similarities and
differences from North American and European countries where audit research is predominant
(Spence et al., 2017). Regulatory changes affect opportunities for democratic control and
legitimacy (Cooper & Robson, 2006), but there seems to be a shift towards regulators receiving
legitimacy if they acquiesce to capital market interests (Malsch & Gendron, 2011). We provide
an example where the regulator was in direct opposition to capital market interests, as well as
a context where social (race) equality and fair competition with the Big 4 is considered a high
enough public value as to be unopposed as an audit industry ethical imperative. Despite many
opposing MAFR, all actors, including the Big 4, strongly embraced race equity as an ideal.
Evidence from the growth in emancipatory accounting research, with its own ‘shift in
meanings’ and resistance to excessive capital interests, indicates that this could be a global
trend (Annisette & Prasad, 2017; Gallhofer & Haslam, 2019). The traditional interpretation of
‘acting in the public interest’ in audit may be evolving, and an interesting avenue for future
research is to explore these diverse logics in the representations of the Big 4 to the public. There
may be a similar move by other audit regulators, taking social democratic values into
consideration, to reinterpret their legislative mandate.
The analysis here can inform regulators. Understanding the reasonable grounds for resistance
can inform a more nuanced policy response to limit negative effects on the profession and audit
quality. The audit profession decried the costly disruption of MAFR and indeed its potential to
lower audit quality outcomes. For example, lower profitability and onerous regulations, if
indeed occurring due to MAFR, reduce the attractiveness of the industry to young professional
accountants and the ability of firms to invest training and retaining talent. PwC claimed that
MAFR would further intensify the “level of fatigue in the profession… a lot of emotional
energy is burned on these proposals... this is not attractive to a new generation of auditors”
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(PwC, 2017, p. 3). These claims could provide interesting avenues for future research into the
effects of MAFR rotation on the industry.
Auditing must enhance the credibility of financial reporting, meaning that audit quality must
remain a primary objective. However, the demand for audit services, which is prefaced on
perceptions of its effectiveness, will only continue so long as both investors and the public trust
the audit firms and the regulator (Wallace, 1980). There needs to be trust in the intentions,
communications and actions of both the regulator and the audit profession. Ideologically driven
public disputes between the two parties undermines this trust and consequently the value of the
audit. Continued corporate and audit failures, together with poor practice review findings, will
continue to drive regulator unease and thus intervention. Rather than resist, the profession may
consider putting forward constructive solutions and seek to cooperate with the regulator. The
profession should be cognisant of changing norms around its obligations to society, especially
those likely to be adopted by the regulator. The Big 4 in particular will always be susceptible
to accusations of trying “to protect a threatened economic monopoly” (Lee, 1995, p. 64) and of
aligning with investor interests (investors who ultimately appoint them). Their appeals to the
public interest are understandably viewed with scepticism. Rather than active resistance,
cooperation and compromise in regulatory debate may be more effective, even if market share
and profitability is threatened. In the interest of maintaining the societal legitimacy of audit,
regulators likewise should heed the legitimate concerns raised by auditors. For example, the
talent retention concerns expressed by auditors in South Africa, who claim that regulation is
making the profession less attractive to young professionals. If true, this could be detrimental
to audit quality in the longer term. The profession and the regulator can be argued to be engaged
in a balancing act between safeguarding the public interest and maintaining a career-attractive
and financially sustainable profession, while supporting confidence in the value of the audit.
The profession and the regulator need each other to achieve these aims.

27

References
Annisette, M., & Prasad, A. (2017). Critical accounting research in hyper-racial times.
Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 43, 5–19.
Arrington, E., & Puxty, A. (1991). Accounting, interests, and rationality: A communicative
relation. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 2, 31–58.
ASISA. (2017). ASISA: Response to the IRBA Consultation Paper (Received directly from the
ASISA). Author, Leon Campher, CEO.
Baker, C. R. (2005). What is the meaning of “the public interest”? Examining the ideology of
the American public accounting profession. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability
Journal, 18(5), 690–703.
BASA. (2017). The Banking Association of South Africa: Response to the IRBA
Consultation Paper. Author, Cas Coovadia, Managing Director. Retrieved June 5, 2017,
from http://www.banking.org.za/docs/default-source/press-releases
Baudot, L., Roberts, R. W., & Wallace, D. M. (2017). An examination of the U.S. public
accounting profession’s public interest discourse and actions in federal policy making.
Journal of Business Ethics, 142(2), 203–220.
Canning, M., & O’Dwyer, B. (2013). The dynamics of a regulatory space realignment:
Strategic responses in a local context. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 38(3),
169–194.
Caramanis, C., Dedoulis, E., & Leventis, S. (2015). Transplanting Anglo-American
accounting oversight boards to a diverse institutional context. Accounting, Organizations
and Society, 42, 12–31.
Casterella, J. R., & Johnston, D. (2013). Can the academic literature contribute to the debate
over mandatory audit firm rotation? Research in Accounting Regulation, 25(1), 108–116.
CFO Forum. (2016). The CFO Forum Response to IRBA’s Consultation Paper, 4 November
2016. Retrieved February 25, 2017, from https://cfo.co.za/article/cfos-reject-mandatoryaudit-rotation-christine-ramon
Clark, N. L., & Worger, W. H. (2016). South Africa: The rise and fall of apartheid (3rd ed.).
New York, NY: Routledge.
Cochran, C. E. (1974). Political science and “the public interest.” The Journal of Politics,
36(2), 327–355.
Cooper, D., & Robson, K. (2006). Accounting, professions and regulation: Locating the sites
of professionalization. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 31(4–5), 415–444.
Dellaportas, S., & Davenport, L. (2008). Reflections on the public interest in accounting.
Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 19(7), 1080–1098.
Deloitte. (2017). Deloitte Inc. South Africa: Response to the IRBA Consultation Paper on
MAFR (Received directly from Deloitte Inc.). Author, Lwazi Bam, CEO Deloitte Africa.
Dowling, C., Knechel, W., & Moroney, R. (2018). Public oversight of audit firms: The
slippery slope of enforcing regulation. Abacus, 54(3), 353–380.
European Commission. (2014). Directorate-General for Financial Stability, EU audit reform.
Directive 2014/56/EU and Regulation 537/2014. Retrieved May 2, 2016, from
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/company-reporting-andauditing/auditing-companies-financial-statements_en#audit-reform-in-the-eu
EY. (2017). EY Inc. South Africa: Response to the IRBA Consultation Paper (Received
directly from EY Inc.). Author, Michael Bourne, Professional Practice Director EY
South Africa.
Francis, J. R. (2004). What do we know about audit quality? The British Accounting Review,
36(4), 345–368.
Gallhofer, S., & Haslam, J. (2019). Some reflections on the construct of emancipatory
28

accounting: Shifting meaning and the possibilities of a new pragmatism. Critical
Perspectives on Accounting, 63, 1–18.
Garcia-Blandon, J., Argilés-Bosch, J. M., & Ravenda, D. (2020). Audit firm tenure and audit
quality: A cross-European study. Journal of International Financial Management and
Accounting, 31(1), 35–64.
Gloeck, J., & de Jager, H. (1994). Meeting expectations and building a brighter future for
auditing in South Africa. Meditari Accountancy Research, 112–154.
Hammond, T., Clayton, B. M., & Arnold, P. J. (2009). South Africa’s transition from
apartheid: The role of professional closure in the experiences of black chartered
accountants. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34(6–7), 705–721.
Hancher, L., & Moran, M. (1989). Organizing regulatory space. In L. Hancher & M. Moran
(Eds.), Capitalism, culture and regulation. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Harber, M., & Maroun, W. (2020). Mandatory audit firm rotation: a critical composition of
practitioner views from an emerging economy. Managerial Auditing Journal, 35(7),
861–896.
Harber, M., Marx, B., & De Jager, P. (2020). The perceived financial effects of mandatory
audit firm rotation. Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting,
31(2), 215–234.
Haynes, K. (2017). Accounting as gendering and gendered: A review of 25 years of critical
accounting research on gender. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 43, 110–124.
Hazgui, M., & Gendron, Y. (2015). Blurred roles and elusive boundaries: On contemporary
forms of oversight surrounding professional work. Accounting, Auditing and
Accountability Journal, 28(8), 1234–1262.
Hazgui, M., & Malsch, B. (2020). Navigating through the spatial and institutional
contradictions of public audit oversight. European Accounting Review, 29(4), 781–802.
Hopwood, A. (1989). Accounting and the pursuit of social interest. In W. F. Chua, E. A.
Lowe, & A. G. Puxty (Eds.), Critical Perspectives in Management Control (pp. 141–
142). London: Macmillan Press.
Horton, J., Tsipouridou, M., & Wood, A. (2018). European market reaction to audit reforms.
European Accounting Review, 27(5), 991–1023.
House of Commons. (2019). The future of audit. Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
Committee. London, UK. Retrieved from
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmbeis/1718/171802.htm
IESBA. (2018). International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants (IESBA), International
Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants, 2018 edition. Retrieved June 24, 2020,
from https://www.ethicsboard.org/iesba-code
IFAC. (2017). The International Federation of Accountants: Response to the IRBA
Consultation Paper on MAFR. Author, Fayez Choudhury, CEO. Retrieved March 5,
2017, from https://www.ifac.org/publications-resources/ifac-response-irba-consultationpaper
IRBA. (2015a). Consultation paper: Measures to Strengthen Auditor Independence. The
Independent Regulatory Board for Auditors. Retrieved November 9, 2015, from
http://www.irba.co.za/news-headlines/press-releases
IRBA. (2015b). IRBA 2015 Annual Report. Retrieved from
https://www.irba.co.za/library/annual-reports
IRBA. (2016a). IRBA Strategic Plan. Retrieved from
http://www.paab.co.za/dmdocuments/irba-strategic-plan-2016-to-2021-for-minister.pdf
IRBA. (2016b). The IRBA Consultation Paper. The Independent Regulatory Board for
Auditors. Retrieved November 15, 2016, from https://www.irba.co.za/news29

headlines/press-releases
IRBA. (2017a). Frequently asked questions: MAFR. The Independent Regulatory Board for
Auditors. Retrieved October 15, 2017, from https://www.irba.co.za/guidelines-tocommentary
IRBA. (2017b). Frequently asked questions on MAFR. The Independent Regulatory Board
for Auditors. Retrieved October 14, 2017, from https://www.irba.co.za/newsheadlines/press-releases
IRBA. (2017c). Gazetted Rule of Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation - Gazette No. 40888. The
Independent Regulatory Board for Auditors. Retrieved June 9, 2017, from
https://www.irba.co.za/news-headlines/general-news/rule-on-mandatory-audit-firmrotation
IRBA. (2019a). IRBA Newsletter 45. The Independent Regulatory Board for Auditors.
Retrieved September 12, 2019, from https://www.irba.co.za/library/irba-news
IRBA. (2019b). IRBA Newsletter 48. The Independent Regulatory Board for Auditors.
Retrieved December 13, 2019, from https://www.irba.co.za/library/irba-news
IRBA. (2019c). Public Inspections Report 2018. The Independent Regulatory Board for
Auditors. Retrieved September 13, 2019, from https://www.irba.co.za/guidance-toras/inspections/reports
JSE. (2016). JSE: Response to the IRBA Consultation Paper on MAFR (Received directly
from JSE).
Knechel, W., Krishnan, G., Pevzner, M., Shefchik, L., & Velury, U. (2013). Audit quality:
Insights from the academic literature. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 32,
385–421.
KPMG. (2017). KPMG Inc. South Africa: Response to the IRBA Consultation Paper on
MAFR (Received directly from KPMG Inc.). Author, Trevor Hoole, CEO KPMG South
Africa.
Lee, T. (1995). The professionalization of accountancy. A history of protecting the public
interest in a self-interested way. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 8(4),
48–69.
Lehman, C. R. (2019). Reflecting on now more than ever: Feminism in accounting. Critical
Perspectives on Accounting, 65, 1–10.
MacDonald, L. D., & Richardson, A. J. (2004). Identity, appropriateness and the construction
of regulatory space: the formation of the Public Accountant’s Council of Ontario.
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 29(5/6), 489–524.
Malsch, B., & Gendron, Y. (2011). Reining in auditors: On the dynamics of power
surrounding an “innovation” in the regulatory space. Accounting, Organizations and
Society, 36(7), 456–476.
Mautz, R. K., & Sharaf, H. A. (1961). The Philosophy of Auditing. Sarasota, FL: American
Accounting Association Monograph No. 6.
Oliver, C. (1991). Strategic responses to institutional processes. The Academy of Management
Review, 16(1), 145–179.
Paisey, C., & Paisey, N. (2020). Protecting the public interest? Continuing professional
development policies and role-profession conflict in accountancy. Critical Perspectives
on Accounting, 67–68, 102040.
Peltzman, S. (1976). Toward a more general theory of regulation. The Journal of Law and
Economics, 19(2), 211–240.
Power, M. K. (2003). Auditing and the production of legitimacy. Accounting, Organizations
and Society, 28(4), 379–394.
PwC. (2017). PwC Inc. South Africa: Response to the IRBA Consultation Paper on MAFR
30

(Received directly from PwC Inc.). Author, Dion Shango, CEO PwC South Africa.
Reid, L. C., & Carcello, J. V. (2017). Investor reaction to the prospect of mandatory audit
firm rotation. The Accounting Review, 92(1), 183–211.
RSA. (2005). Auditing Profession Act (No 26 of 2005). Retrieved May 5, 2016, from
http://www.acts.co.za/auditing-profession-act-2005/auditing_profession_act__2005_
RSA. (2013). The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act, 53 of 2003 (B-BBEE
Act), as amended by B-BBEE Act 46 of 2013. Retrieved August 15, 2018, from
https://www.thedti.gov.za/economic_empowerment/BBBEE_ACT2013.pdf
RSA. (2017a). South African Parliament: Standing Committee on Finance. Mandatory Audit
Firm Rotation: Public hearings. Minutes dated 15 February 2017. The Parliamentary
Monitoring Group. Retrieved from https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/23965/
RSA. (2017b). South African Parliament: Standing Committee on Finance. Mandatory Audit
Firm Rotation: Public hearings. Minutes dated 17 March 2017. The Parliamentary
Monitoring Group. Retrieved from https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/24203/
SAICA. (2017). SAICA: Comments To the IRBA’s Consultation Paper on MAFR, 20
January 2017. Author, Terence Nombembe, CEO, SAICA. Retrieved February 25, 2017,
from https://www.saica.co.za/portals/0/documents/SAICAsCommentReport.pdf
Scott, C. (2001). Analysing regulatory space: fragmented resources and institutional design.
Public Law, Summer, 283–305.
Shapiro, B., & Matson, D. (2008). Strategies of resistance to internal control regulation.
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 33(2/3), 199–228.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2007.04.002
Sikka, P. (2009). Financial crisis and the silence of the auditors. Accounting, Organizations
and Society, 34(6–7), 868–873.
Spence, C., Zhu, J., Endo, T., & Matsubara, S. (2017). Money, honour and duty: Global
professional service firms in comparative perspective. Accounting, Organizations and
Society, 62, 82–97.
Suddaby, R., & Greenwood, R. (2005). Rhetorical strategies of legitimacy. Administrative
Science Quarterly, 50, 35–67.
Tepalagul, N., & Lin, L. (2015). Auditor independence and audit quality: A literature review.
Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 30(1), 101–121.
The Economist. (2019a). Efforts to fix the market in auditing rumble on. Retrieved April 14,
2019, from https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2019/01/26/efforts-tofix-the-market-in-auditing-rumble-on
The Economist. (2019b). The government announces plans for a mightier audit regulator.
Retrieved April 14, 2019, from https://www.economist.com/britain/2019/03/14/thegovernment-announces-plans-for-a-mightier-audit-regulator
van Brenk, H., Renes, R., & Trompeter, G. M. (2020). Auditing in the public interest:
Reforming the profession by building on the strengths of the existing accounting firms.
Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 102184.
Verhoef, G. (2013). Reluctant ally: The development of statutory regulation of the
accountancy profession in South Africa, 1904–1951. Accounting History, 18(2), 163–
191.
Wallace, W. A. (1980). The economic role of the audit in free and regulated markets. Aid to
Education Program. Touche Ross & Co.
WEF. (2018). The World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 2018. Retrieved
September 13, 2019, from www.weforum.org/gcr.
Westermann, K. D., Cohen, J., & Trompeter, G. (2019). PCAOB inspections: Public
accounting firms on “trial.” Contemporary Accounting Research, 36(2), 694–731.
31

Young, J. J. (1994). Outlining regulatory space: Agenda issues and the FASB. Accounting,
Organizations and Society, 19(1), 83–109.

32

